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Citizenship and Arbitrary Law-Making: On the 
Quaintness of Non-national Disenfranchisement
Patricia Mindus
The paper explores forms of arbitrariness in relation to citizenship and migration policies. Non-national 
disenfranchisement follows from certain migration policies, and these may be cast as an arbitrary form 
of domination, that may undermine political legitimacy. Political exclusion is the vertex of a chain of 
other forms of exclusion: the denizenship of the politically powerless is particularly bothersome because 
liberal-democratic systems lack incentives to promote their rights. We have singled out the specificity and 
quaintness of the argumentative strateg y employed to sustain non-national disenfranchisement. It differs 
from other argumentations in favour of disenfranchisement because it is not framed in derogatory terms 
and shifts the burden of proof from the state over to the individual.
Introduction
Arbitrary law is the hallmark of domination, illegitimate power, despotism. 
Avoiding arbitrariness is key to avoid domination, as a long-standing Repu-
blican tradition of political thought has made clear1. In a world of great mi-
grations (transnational or otherwise) the authority to determine the ‘people’ in 
terms of citizenship and migration policy, i.e. to define the demos, is essentially 
about the «sovereign power to exclude»2, and exclusion without (sufficient) 
reason-giving is the hallmark of arbitrary power that reduces and limits our 
ability to conduct non-dominated lives. Moreover, the use of this power to 
exclude defines the constitutional identity of a political regime.
1  The use of  the term here is the one that occurs in the contemporary republican debate on 
domination. According to Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit (2009: 9), a free person is «one who 
does not live under the arbitrary will or domination of  others». See also Frank Lovett (2012), 
for a critical perspective see Patchen Markell (2008). The expression ‘arbitrary power’ usually 
refers to an authority that is free to act following nothing but his own will, without consider-
ing any limits and constraints. To use Montesquieu’s classical phrasing in Esprit des lois: «It has 
eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he 
finds limits» (1989: 155 [1748]).
2  The expression comes from the Supreme Court in Trop vs. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958): 355.
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Yet, arbitrariness is poorly understood and underexplored in relation to 
citizenship and migration policy. This is regrettable because, as we shall see, 
disenfranchisement can be seen as the outcome of certain migration and citi-
zenship policies. By viewing citizenship and migration policies from the per-
spective of disenfranchisement, new areas and dimensions of the problem of 
arbitrary law-making emerge.
We can view legal positions that single individuals may come to occupy 
as located along a spectrum stretching from full (legal) inclusion to full (legal) 
exclusion. The right to access national territory is here considered in a conti-
nuum on the other end of which we find full civic inclusion entailing franchise 
(civis optimo iure): this is the way the road to living under democratic rule fre-
quently looks for those making the journey3.
My basic claim is the following: the level of illegitimate use of power incre-
ases by making the route to enfranchisement longer for non-nationals having 
some stake in a given community. In other words, state power becomes all the 
more arbitrary as the chain of obstacles to living under a rule to which one has 
given one’s consent becomes longer. The obstacles on the way to citizenship, 
in other words, may be cast as an arbitrary form of domination, which in 
turn undermines political legitimacy. If we view border control policies in 
line with naturalisation and enfranchisement practices, consistently with the 
perspective of many migrants, then it becomes clear that by making the route 
to enfranchisement longer, the level of illegitimate use of power increases and 
the plight of domination worsens.
Disenfranchisement of non-nationals, hindering access to full civic inclu-
sion, is problematic for different reasons. This paper focuses of the legal form 
of non-national disenfranchisement and the quaintness of the argumentative 
strategies employed to uphold it4.
Enfranchisement, Affectedness and Legitimacy
Enfranchisement sets the level of autonomy that the legal order recognizes for 
fully capacitated adult agents in most liberal-democratic constitutional orders 
3  This paper develops a key idea of  the project I run as Wallenberg Academy Fellow 2015-
2020. For more information please see the website: www.civissum.eu. The paper presents re-
sults from the project Arbitrary Law-making in Today’s Citizenship and Border Control Policies funded 
by the Swedish Research Council (2012-2015).
4  A previous version of  this paper was presented at the Higher Seminar Series in Philosophy 
of  Law at the Philosophy Department, Uppsala University, November 2015. I would like to 
thank Anthoula Malkopoulou, Guilherme Marques Pedro and Sebastian Reyes Molina for 
comments on the earlier draft.
105CITIZENSHIP AND ARBITRARY LAW-MAKING
and it is often seen as a source of legitimate power, i.e. that through which 
consent is given, and that therefore makes state coercion not merely an exer-
cise of the monopoly of the use of force. In other words, enfranchisement is 
seen as a benchmark of legitimacy: a necessary albeit insufficient condition for 
establishing a political order to which people give their consent. Enfranchise-
ment does more than that: It says something about the constitutional identity 
of a political regime. Since Aristotle, the number of rulers counts as criteria 
for defining the nature of a polity. Here I take franchise to be essential to sub-
stantiate legitimacy in constitutional democracies. It is, first, a normative th-
reshold and, second, a descriptive criteria of identification of political regimes.
Disenfranchisement constitutes a thorn in the side of liberal democratic 
legitimacy (Benton 2008). Because, generally speaking, disenfranchisement 
challenges liberal-democratic regimes since it breaks the (ideal) symmetry 
between the rulers and the ruled that is often considered a foundation of (de-
mocratic) legitimacy. This ideal refers to a fundamental principle of demo-
cratic government, i.e. the principle of affectedness, meaning that all those 
affected by a political decision should have a say in its making and those who 
are not affected should have no say.
Even though the principle seems fairly straightforward, it gives rise to 
many concerns, both in practice and in theory5. Although an in-depth 
analysis of the scope, range and application of the principle of affectedness 
is beyond the purpose of this paper and would require a paper in its own 
right, it is safe to say that this principle functions as a regulatory ideal in 
the Kantian sense. Here, it is used as an indicator of potential problems of 
legitimacy. We thus adopt a minimal definition of affectedness as pursuant 
to a condition of steady presence on state territory for natural or physi-
cal persons who de facto live under a given national jurisdiction. This is of 
course a minimal account of affectedness that uses presence on the territory 
as a proxy, which some will surely consider to be a way of conflating the 
principle of subjection with that of affectedness. But this need not worry 
us for the present purposes. In fact, neither a principle referring to affected 
interest (subjectively or objectively determined), nor a principle referring to 
subjection to coercive laws can be confined to inclusion of residents within 
state territory. Both hinge on the undetermined character of the principles 
at hand, as well as the unclear category of ‘residence’, halfway between a 
factual claim and a legal institute. Bearing this in mind, the proxy can be 
used and our minimal definition employed.
5  On the ‘principle of  affectedness’ see Frederick G. Whelan (1983), while Robert Dahl (1989) 
refers to this principle when discussing the ‘problem of  unity’ in Democracy and Its Critics.
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What needs to be stressed however is that the affectedness ideal is here 
not applied as a method to determine borders of appropriate constituencies 
but as a regulative ideal (Arrhenius 2005 and 2011). A method to determine 
how to make decisions is justified by reference to a normative ideal, while the 
normative ideal (the principle of affectedness) is justified by reflective equili-
brium, weighing our normative judgments and a set of methodological and 
epistemological criteria, such as consistency etc. For example, utilitarianism 
is often accused of not providing a criterion or rule-of-thumb for deciding 
what action ought to be taken because, in any situation in which we are cal-
led to act, we cannot calculate in advance all the effects of a decision, and 
then choose the one that maximizes well-being as the ideal of utilitarianism 
prescribes. However, this is not an argument against the normative ideal. If 
we were utilitarian, we should not stop trying to get closer to the ideal of ma-
ximizing wellbeing only because it is difficult to do so. It would be analogous 
to concluding that the value-freedom of science is not a scientific value to be 
pursued only because there is a lot of research the impartiality of which may 
be doubted, or that health is not an ideal to which we should strive given the 
existence of diseases. In a similar way, the principle of affectedness might be 
inappropriate as a method for defining constituencies, without being an ideal 
to be rejected6. This is why we can continue without entering the debate on 
affectedness and keeping our minimal definition.
So, the affectedness principle instantiated by the classic formula quod om-
nibus tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet is a key principle in democratic 
theory of legitimacy, notwithstanding the fact that it does not include criteria 
on how to determine who has a stake in an issue; a determination that can 
be done both subjectively and objectively. Both ways presents problems that, 
however, need not be addressed here. The only aspect that is important for 
the continuation of the argument is that the principle of affectedness, cast as 
a regulative ideal, has a high level of indeterminacy. One of the problematic 
features then is that the principle of affectedness, construed in this minima-
6  In fact, some believe that the principle of  affectedness is simply impracticable, like David 
Held. For instance, if  one wanted to apply the principle to any policy decision, we would be 
forced to conclude that, strictly speaking, we can know the extent of  the effects only after the 
decision has been taken, so ignoring what the decision is we cannot know who should partici-
pate in its taking. There are also those who complain about the situation of  legal uncertainty 
that would reign in a world of  fluid borders and variables. Celebrated by some advocates of  de-
liberative democracy, such as John Dryzek (1996), the volatility of  boundaries redrawn at every 
(kind of) decision to be taken by diverse communities, is for the critics, like Dahl, for example, a 
serious risk to the state law. For a discussion see R.E. Goodin (2007), for a reconstruction of  this 
debate see Johan Karlsson Schaffer (2011) and Patricia Mindus (2014 – especially chapter 5).
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listic way, does not allow to account for exactly for how many and which non-
nationals are disenfranchised. This might be a question of grades.
By suggesting that there is a spectrum stretching from full inclusion to full 
exclusion, we may still highlight how contemporary liberal democracies fail to 
live up to the ideal by excluding legally resident non-nationals from franchise 
and by excluding a range of other non-nationals within the jurisdiction from 
granting to prospect of one day naturalizing.
The distinction that is central to this paper is between nationals and non-
nationals. Yet the category of non-nationals is quite broad and includes non-
resident non-nationals having no relationship with a given jurisdiction. We 
can call them absolute foreigners. Different non-national categories may be 
relevant to the argument given here, such as non-national residents, third 
country nationals in the European Union, non-nationals granted temporary 
permits of stay, illegal migrants present on the territory, asylum seekers and 
more. What all these categories share, and what distinguishes them from ab-
solute foreigners, is that they may be said to have a stake in the community.
Of course to define a ‘stake’ is per se a daunting challenge: subjective deter-
mination of ‘stakes’ is problematic (there are people who feel worried without 
being affected, and affected people who do not worry), and there still is no 
scientific method to determine whether a person has a ‘stake’ in any objective 
sense (we lack a criterion for the rationality of preferences). So by ‘stake’ here I 
mean who de facto stands in a relationship with a given jurisdiction, as opposed 
to the great majority of human beings who do not. 
This explains why a critical assessment of the lack of voting rights for all 
non-citizens or non-nationals would go beyond the purposes of this paper, sin-
ce the latter category would include absolute foreigners. Defining ‘stake’ as ha-
ving a de facto relationship to a given jurisdiction excludes from this inquiry the 
question of whether or not absolute foreigners should be given voting right(s). 
There is of course a debate going on about whether voting rights should be 
granted also to non-resident non-nationals on the basis of their having some 
form of stake in the community. But in this debate the stake is, first of all, 
conceived as an a-territorial claim (or better: a claim regardless of the territo-
rial boundaries of a jurisdiction), and this is so regardless of whether the stake 
ought to be understood in a subjective or objective sense. Second, this debate 
over cosmopolitan democracy, i.e. if it is (il)legitimate to give voting rights to 
non-nationals, hinges on the idea that the principle of affectedness would be a 
method for determining policies, and not a regulative ideal. Here, this princi-
ple figures only as a regulative ideal. We can thus leave this debate aside.
The focus thus falls on today’s arguably most critical form of disenfran-
chisement, as a blunt violation of the regulative ideal of affectedness: that of 
non-nationals and the exercise of arbitrary power that it embodies.
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Border control and naturalisation policies generate a critical form of disen-
franchisement. The denizenship of the politically powerless is particularly bo-
thersome because liberal-democratic systems lack incentives to promote their 
rights. This turns their disenfranchisement into a particular form of arbitrary 
rule exercised by the enfranchised majority. With the words of Michael Wal-
zer (1983: 62), «the rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over stran-
gers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history». This 
is the reason why it offers an interesting testing ground for assessing the level, 
type and nature of the arbitrary power exercised by the state. 
In searching for a good testing ground for examining arbitrary power 
practices in today’s law and policy-making, a specific form of disenfranchise-
ment practice can be singled out as particularly interesting: the disenfranchi-
sement of non-nationals; and as we will show below, primarily of categories 
of non-nationals that are barred from naturalisation, such as illegal migrants.
This, however, does not depend on any claim about border control being 
per se an instance of arbitrary exercise of political power, as many democratic 
globalists and cosmopolitan advocates of open borders would claim. Rather, 
it depends on the kind of argumentative strategy that is used to sustain the 
exclusion of non-nationals from franchise, which determines the rule of ci-
tizens over non-citizens within a single jurisdiction. Strategies employed to 
justify legal provisions of disenfranchisement in the case of non-nationals dif-
fers radically from that of nationals. One may thus stay agnostic about the (il)
legitimacy of border control and still uphold the thesis defended in this paper.
Ordinary and Extraordinary Disenfranchisement
Clearly, disenfranchisement, i.e. being legally barred from exercising political 
rights, has be given many faces in the course of history – ranging from Third 
Country Nationals in the EU to Brazilian illiterates, from mentally disabled 
people in Eastern Europe to inmates in Asia, from French domestiques to Athe-
nian women, and so forth (Rosanvallon 1992, Beckman and Erman 2012). No 
wonder then that the strategies of argumentation or reason-giving in favour of 
disenfranchisement practices have varied.
Among reasons adduced in our modern world to sustain disenfranchise-
ment, we find claims of self-government by autonomous ethnic communities, 
used to exclude indigenous people in Canada from exercising political rights 
until the federal elections in 1960, and blacks in South Africa until the 1994 
general election (Bartlett 1980, Kirkby 2010). The disenfranchisement of ci-
tizens affected by mental disabilities in several countries has been supported 
because of the need to defend the integrity and dignity of elections (Bartlett 
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et al. 2007, Vyhnánek 2010). The so-called «felony disenfranchise» (Ispahani 
2009: 12) has been sustained on the basis of both punitive and regulatory argu-
ments. Liberal and contract-theory tools have also been applied to the claim 
that criminal disenfranchisement is the logical outcome of the breaking of the 
social pact perpetuated by offenders who violate the law7.
Notwithstanding great variation in the strategies employed to justify legal 
provisions of disenfranchisement8, an important threshold can be determi-
ned: the difference lies in whether the disenfranchisement is conceived as a 
principle of the system or as an exception to the rule. The dialectics between 
rule and exception that emerge from the argumentative strategies used to 
exclude people from franchise provide relevant criteria for distinguishing so-
called ordinary from extraordinary forms of disenfranchisement.
Ordinary forms of disenfranchisement are those that the system presuppo-
ses or takes for granted, those for which therefore there is no requirement of 
reason-giving or justificatory practice. Extraordinary forms of disenfranchise-
ment are those that the system do not presuppose or take for granted, those for 
which therefore there is a requirement of reason-giving: the system engages in 
justificatory practices in order to uphold these forms of disenfranchisement. 
To exclude non-nationals appears to be an ‘ordinary’ form of exclusion, 
needing no justification. In most legal systems, enfranchisement is reserved 
to nationals having full legal capacity. There are of course exceptions, both of 
non-national franchise (Shaw 2007) and of external voting (Bauböck 2007), as 
well as a few cases of illegal migrants voting (Sadiq 2008). Admitting non-na-
tionals to political representation seems to be a strengthening trend in many 
liberal-democratic countries but it is still far from constituting a serious con-
tender to the standard exclusion of non-nationals.
Indeed, as a default position before the legal order, non-nationals in 
most commonly recognized liberal-democratic regimes are disenfranchised 
notwithstanding their presence on state territory. This implies that, even if 
they happen to hold the legal citizenship or nationality of another state, they 
still fit into the category of ‘subjects’9 with reference to the state they are loca-
ted in. This means they are passive members of the political community. 
The standard form of such subjecthood is embodied by fully capacitated 
persons who are non-nationals deprived of franchise. 
7  This was notoriously stated in Green vs. Board of  Elections where the US Supreme Court af-
firmed this position by quoting John Locke, see Jesse Furman (1997).
8  For the argumentative strategies behind disenfranchisement, see Ludvig Beckman (2009).
9  Subjects are those to whom directives and norms are addressed yet that are not entitled to 
take part in shaping these norms, in whatsoever form. The subject is under the political obliga-
tion to obey the laws to which he or she has not given direct or indirect consent.
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The fact that some non-nationals may choose to remain outside the politi-
cal sphere of their state of residency for numerous reasons need not worry us 
here: it is secondary to establishing whether one is deprived of the very possi-
bility to choose such a voluntary form of subjecthood. 
Do note that here we do not deal with self-imposed or socially imposed 
disenfranchisement. Rather, we only look at disenfranchisement de iure. Be-
cause being entitled to the right to vote constitutes a threshold. This threshold 
defines those who are entitled to a privileged relationship with the state (most 
typically, nationals) and those who are not (most typically, non-nationals). 
Whether nationals are able to enforce this privileged relationship and/or whe-
ther non-nationals are even interested in having a political relationship in the 
form of participation and enfranchisement is secondary to the issue addressed 
here. So the fact that non-nationals are a varied group from the sociological 
perspective is not an argument that can be used against the thesis of this pa-
per. Social composition of non-national groups is irrelevant in order to esta-
blish entitlement to franchise. Indeed, the rules that determine who counts as 
national and who does not, and the rules that determine who is entitled to vote 
and who is not, are clear and well-known in each jurisdiction. 
Disfranchisement of non-nationals embodies arbitrariness in contempora-
ry constitutional democracies where the principle of legitimacy is grounded 
on the ideal of all-affectedness. Most typically, non-nationals are excluded 
from full political citizenship, which (especially in the case of long-term resi-
dents) bluntly mocks the ideal of affectedness. But unlike other disenfranchi-
sed categories such as minors, inmates, and convicts, the disenfranchisement 
of non-nationals is not presented as an exception to the rule. In the case of 
disfranchisement of nationals, the provision works like the institution called 
capitis deminutio media in Roman law: the situation in which a Roman citizen 
passed from the status of full Roman citizenship, civitas optimo iure, to what 
was called civitas sine iura suffragii et honorum, i.e. a situation in which the person 
loses the entitlement to political rights of participation (Sherwin-White 1939, 
Gaudemet 1984, Thomas 1996, Lovisi 2003).
Disfranchisement of non-nationals embodies arbitrariness because it cre-
ates political subjects in a system the legitimacy of which depends on such 
subjecthood being connected to enfranchisement.
Yet another aspect of non-nationals disenfranchisement should interest us 
here: how it frames who is accountable for proving what. The disenfranchi-
sement of non-nationals is different from other types of disenfranchisement 
because it is not conceived as an exception, but as the rule. This has important 
implications for the attribution of the burden of proof in the event of litigation. 
Institutions of disenfranchisement are prevailingly justified as an exception to 
the rule. Archetypically, minors are disenfranchised because they are unable 
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to conscientiously perform the politically salient activities involved in voting 
and standing in elections due to special circumstances (young age). The legal 
form of minor disenfranchisement is derogation on the basis of circumstance.
Archetypically, mentally disabled persons are disenfranchised because 
they are unable to conscientiously perform the politically salient activities in-
volved in voting and standing in elections due to special personal characteristics 
(incapacity). The legal form of disenfranchisement is derogation on the basis 
of personal attributes.
More generally, standardized classes of people have their rights restricted 
and these limitations are justified as exceptions to the general rule, granting 
these rights to those of ordinary capacity10. Hence, freedom of movement 
may be restricted; the right to vote may be withdrawn but this can legi-
timately be done only under special circumstances and/or due to special personal 
characteristics for which the state needs to account. This means that burden 
of proof thus falls automatically on the state intending to restrict the exercise 
of such rights.
The legal form of non-national disenfranchisement is however not of a 
derogatory type: it is the rule, not the exception. Moreover, it is a rule that 
constitutes the very system.
By construing the exclusion of non-nationals as the rule there is a rarely 
noticed shift in the allocation of the burden of proof from the state to indivi-
duals, from the governors to the governed. In this lies another aspect of the 
arbitrariness that non-national disenfranchisement embodies. In other words, 
while it is the state that needs to prove why inmates are to be disenfranchised, 
it is the individual who is required to provide evidence for his/her lawful pre-
sence on the territory that is in practice the first step in order to acquire the 
status that provides access to franchise.
Models of Citizenship and Forms of Disenfranchisement
The argumentative strategy that grounds the disenfranchisement of non-
nationals is very different from that used for other disenfranchised groups. 
This is due to the fact that the conception of citizenship that underpins the 
disenfranchisement of non-nationals is not the conception of citizenship that 
lies behind other categories’ exclusion from franchise. 
10  Capacity is an aspect of  a person’s status and defined by a person’s personal law, i.e. for natu-
ral persons, the law of  nationality or lex patriae, or of  habitual residence in civil law states and 
residence in many common law jurisdictions.
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Here we should distinguish between the political and the legal concep-
tions of citizenship (Mindus 2014). The political model that grounds demo-
cracy and addresses the question of legitimacy, opposes the ‘citizen’ to the 
‘subject’, i.e. the disenfranchised and thus passive member of a political com-
munity; while the legal conception stresses national sovereignty and protects 
the rule of law, it opposes ‘citizen’ to ‘alien’, i.e. the non-national. Alien here 
includes both the foreigner (person lacking the nationality of the state of re-
ference yet having the nationality of another state) and the stateless (person 
deprived of any nationality). To a great extent, modern law has identified 
nationality and citizenship (there are various constellations thereof and this 
identification was made possible under the principle of sovereignty)11. Citi-
zenship, within this conception, is thus merely the positive reflection of the 
status of alien. In other words, for legal science, citizenship is the status of 
those who are entitled to claim a series of legally recognized positions before 
the state. The paradigmatic word for this is Staatsangehörigkeit, which literally 
means ‘belonging to the State’.
Whereas in the political conception of citizenship, legitimacy in principle 
stems from the participation of ‘the people’, i.e. the sum of the citizens, in sha-
ping the common rules under which they live and thus exclusion from such 
co-participation must be motivated, the legal model of citizenship – that is the 
background theory of citizenship employed in defending disenfranchisement 
of non-nationals – does not say much about justifying disenfranchisement: 
voting or standing in elections are usually described as a form of bonus right 
ascribed to some nationals (natural persons with full legal capacity, in some 
cases of passive electoral rights, they also need to be over a certain age th-
reshold). The state does not offer motivations and is not held to do so, mainly 
on the basis of the principle of sovereignty, out of which self-determination 
of whom to include in the system derives. As a growing stream of research is 
highlighting, it is problematic to assume that sovereignty as a concept is even 
compatible with rule of law (Eleftheriadis 2009) so that sovereignty cannot 
per se constitute sufficient reason to exclude non-citizens without reason-gi-
ving and pushing the burden of proof onto the individual.
Not only does the State offer no reasons, the legal system does not even 
rule out the possibility of prohibiting some natural persons with full capacity 
of accessing the said legal system, a precondition for acquiring the status of 
11  The two paradigmatic models are often conceived as the French ius soli-centred model and 
the German ius sanguinis-focused model, see Roger Brubaker (1992) and Pietro Costa (1999). 
More specifically see Markus Krajewski and Helmut Rittstieg (1996), Paul Lagarde (1996), 
Andreas K. Fahrmeier (1997), Benoit Guiguet (1999), Alfred Schumacher (2001), Patrick Weil 
(2002), Ulrich K. Preuss (2003) and Edwige L. Lefebvre (2003).
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citizenship that provides access to enfranchisement. A number of border con-
trol techniques, asylum and migration policy provisions have this function.
This possibility engenders what can be described as an indirect form of 
disenfranchisement practice that is, however, not understood as such by con-
temporary political and legal theory. Indeed, mainstream literature on disen-
franchisement12 only considers provisions relative to either nationals or those 
non-nationals that are legally resident within the state, thus failing to see how, 
in the broader context, disenfranchisement is effectively implemented throu-
gh keeping fully capable adults from being granted access to legal positions 
(such as residency, permits of stay, asylum, etc.) that would enable them to 
apply for naturalisation at a later stage. Some live large parts of their lives in 
this disenfranchised limbo, yet within the territorial sphere of states that are 
generally held to be constitutional democracies.
Do note that, as to this argument’s soundness, the difference between non-
nationals legally present on state territory and so-called illegal migrants who 
lack entitlement to dwell on the very same territory (on which we focus later 
on), is not relevant because the legal/illegal migration status is not derivative 
so much of the subjects themselves as dependant on the temporal dimension 
they are located in. In other words, many migrants fall in and out of legal stay 
and residency and this may happen on multiple occasions in the course of 
their migrational career. The distinction between legally and illegally present 
on territory, itself quite fluid, does not impact disenfranchisement since both 
categories are barred from access to political rights. Yet the distinction betwe-
en legally and illegally present is relevant in differentiating between steps 
along the way to enfranchisement, as we will see in the next section.
The rule of excluding non-nationals from franchise in the legal model 
of citizenship was historically explained by the extraneousness or exteriori-
ty of foreigners, usually located in physically distant places without relations 
or with few contacts with the autochthon population. Clearly, any such an 
a priori assumption in a globally interconnected world of mass-migration is 
unwarranted. On the whole, some 2.9% of the world population live outside 
their country of origin.
Furthermore, let us suppose that the legal order would cease to uphold 
non-national disenfranchisement as a rule. Apart from being a political non-
starter in many constitutional settlements, this would not eliminate the pro-
blem of arbitrariness, even though it might modify its concrete manifestations. 
Because even if we assume that non-national disenfranchisement has to be 
12  See, among others, Zig Layton-Henry (1990), Jamin B. Raskin (1993), Virginia Harper-Ho 
(2000) and Richard S. Katz (2000).
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justified, just like other forms of disenfranchisement, in terms of derogation 
from a rule, the size and nature of the issue would still leave lots of room 
for claiming that non-national disenfranchisement amounts to arbitrary law-
making. Non-nationals have to the same extent as nationals full legal capacity 
and thus share the historically speaking key criterion used in practices di-
senfranchising nationals. Moreover, the number of people involved is rising. 
Since derogation in no way modifies the rule as such, as long as it remains an 
exception, this implies that, if the sheer number of those (dis)enfranchised is 
sufficient (there is of course debate over what that threshold is, but we shall 
leave the details of that discussion aside), it cannot be claimed that it is a ‘mere 
exception’, for the same reason that a ‘state of exception’ that lasts sine die 
amounts to the instauration of a new regime and is not an exception to the 
previous regime.
Making the Route to Citizenship Longer
Today the most critical form of disenfranchisement is that of non-nationals. 
This is so because of the exercise of arbitrary power that lies behind it. Within 
this category, exclusion from political rights of illegal migrants is particularly 
problematic. Saskia Sassen wrote some years ago that, in this realm, the most 
important distinction is between those with legal migration status and those 
without it (Sassen 1996). This holds true today. «More then any other pheno-
menon, illegal migration points up to the immense and arbitrary privilege of 
birth in a prosperous state» (Dauvergne 2009: 8).
Although it is hard to measure the number of illegal migrants (because they 
are illegal), some speak of around 12 million in the US, 14 million in Russia 
among whom some 700,000 illegal Chinese in the Far East, some 10 million 
in Eastern Europe including Central Asia, up to a million in the UK, some 
150,000 in Italy, some 3 million around the EU, and India with its estimated 
16 million illegal immigrants, another 2 million in Thailand, and up to 8 mil-
lion in South Africa (source BBC). In 2005 the UN estimate was some 50 mil-
lion illegal migrants out of the overall 190 million migrants around the world.
Within the category of non-national disenfranchisement one specific group 
can be singled out as the most vulnerable to arbitrary law-making: that of il-
legal migrants. This category is not only disenfranchised but prohibited from 
recognition as disenfranchised. Illegal migrants are thus excluded from fran-
chise in a drastically more severe fashion than legal migrants. Because legal 
migrants might be barred from political rights but they are not barred from 
naturalization (even if it might turn out to be extremely cumbersome, e.g. in 
Switzerland). Illegal migrants are, most typically, barred from naturalizing.
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Some defenders of disenfranchisement of non-nationals might insist that 
non-national residents who reject a fair naturalisation offer cannot claim to 
be arbitrarily disenfranchised, yet it is specifically the fair naturalisation offer 
that no illegal is offered qua illegal. Illegal migrants are barred from being 
recognized as being governed by the legal system in that they are natural 
persons with full capacity living under the laws of the country they are in and 
contributing to its social fabric.
This means that today we face a form of indirect disenfranchisement that 
is not properly addressed: it does not amount merely to exclusion from voting 
rights but from the status entailing such rights (i.e. nationality) and (in the 
worst cases) overall exclusion from rights (rightlessness which often follows de 
facto from being incapable of availing oneself of the protection of one’s country 
of origin; most recurrently the case of illegal migrants and trafficked people). 
Such forms of exclusion are challenging legitimacy, because they prevent a 
priori any future political representation: while minors will grow up, illiterates 
can learn how to read, convicts may re-acquire their franchise etc., being 
barred from access to any legal system in the sense of not being able to avail 
oneself of the protection of a state entails a form of truly apolitical condition.
What the legal system fails to recognize, in other words, is the factual 
circumstance that – according to the tenets of legitimacy of the system as 
such, i.e. according to the political conception of citizenship that grounds the 
legitimacy of the exercise of coercion by state actors in liberal-democratic 
settings – activates the legal entitlement to being included in the system. So, 
by referring to one and the same factual condition (presence on state territory) 
one group of people gain access and recognition while another is prohibited 
from accessing the said legal system. Or to rephrase it, the legal system is 
blind when it comes to that specific group. Pertinence to state territory, to put 
it elegantly, makes some more equal than others. 
There is an interesting corollary to this thesis. Suppose we have a system, 
the legitimacy of which is based on the assumption that those who can be 
coerced by the State have a stake in the jurisdiction and – if no special cir-
cumstances or personal incapacity are at hand – this stake offers sufficient 
reason for being entitled to voting rights. Then, when chunks of the popula-
tion live in conditions of political disempowerment, with no clear prospect of 
gaining franchise, the legitimacy of the exercise of coercion by state actors 
is challenged. This is what seems to be happening today, in a world with 
millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced people, not to men-
tion other forms of migration. The crucial role of defining the demos in terms 
of citizenship and migration policy can therefore no longer be downplayed. 
Acquisition and loss of citizenship does not belong to the legal backwaters of 
administrative law: it is a question of high constitutional weight since such 
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policies determine, in a mediated way, who are those entitled to participate 
in collective decision-making. Simply put, the appearance of disenfranchised 
masses in contemporary democracies – modern metics – questions the sta-
te’s sovereign right to define its people (Abizadeh 2008, Mindus and Goldoni 
2012). But this corollary merits a paper in its own right.
This paper explored arbitrariness in relation to citizenship and migration po-
licies. Non-national disenfranchisement follows from certain migration policies, 
and these may be cast as an arbitrary form of domination, that may undermine 
political legitimacy. Political exclusion is the vertex of a chain of other forms of 
exclusion: the denizenship of the politically powerless is particularly botherso-
me because liberal-democratic systems lack incentives to promote their rights. 
We have singled out the specificity and quaintness of the argumentative strategy 
employed to sustain non-national disenfranchisement. It differs from other ar-
gumentations in favour of disenfranchisement because it is not framed in dero-
gatory terms and shifts the burden of proof from the state over to the individual.
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